幕末 尊王攘夷 運動 : 尊王攘夷派 公卿을 中心으로

Abstract

幕末 幕藩體制의 內部矛盾 深化와 外勢의 위협에 대한 幕府의 無能한 대처는 蘿權을 후퇴시켰고 대신 幕府의 上位體인 朝廷을 政治權으로 불러내었다. 그리고 이런 흐름 속에서 朝廷으로 政權을 返還하려는 尊王壤夷派와, 朝廷과 幕府의 融和로 幕藩體制를 維持·强化하려한 公武合體派 등 여러 집단이 대립하게 된다. 원래 尊王이란 儒敎的 名分論 下에 社會秩序를 維持하려는 體制 維持的 성격이 강한 思想이었으나 幕末 政局의 혼란 속에서 外勢를 排擊하자는 壤夷思想과 결합하여 幕府를 무너뜨리고 朝廷으로 政權을 회복하자는 反幕, 倒幕 運動으로 전환하게 된다. 尊王攘夷派에 대한 기존의 硏究는 각 藩 차원에서의 구성원의 階層 분석과 思想的 根源 파악 등에 치우쳐 이들을 無計劃的이고 非組織的인 단순, 과격 집단으로 평가하고 있다. 그러나 尊王攘夷派를 구성한 계층의 하나인 尊王攘夷派 公卿들을 중심으로 살펴보면 그들의 활발한 정치적 활동을 認知할 수 있다. 따라서 筆者는 尊王攘夷派의 최대 전성기였던 文久2~3년(1862~1863)을 中心으로 尊王攘夷派 公卿들을 통하여 尊王攘夷派의 政治的 活動과 그 특징을 살펴보고자 한다. 우선 文久2년 尊王攘夷派의 形成과 公卿과의 관계를 살펴보고 이들 尊王攘夷派가 公卿을 중심으로 어떠한 政治活動을 펼쳐 幕府와 公武合體派를 압박했는지, 그리고 이에 대한 幕府의 대응은 어떠했는지를 알아 본 후 公卿을 통한 尊王攘夷派의 政治活動의 特徵은 무엇인지, 그리고 어째서 1863년 8월 18일 政變으로 京都에서 敗退하게 되었는지를 살펴보고자 한다. 이 주제는 기존의 硏究가 부족한 실정으로 주로 史料를 통해 論究하고자 한다. 즉『維新史』와 『孝明天皇紀』를 基本 史料로 하고 尊王攘夷派 측의 史料인 『三條實美公年譜』와 『修訂 防長回天史』, 『眞木和泉守遺文』 『竹亭回顧錄·維新前後』등과 이와 반대되는 公武合體派와 幕府 측의 史料인 『伊達宗城在京日記』 『德川慶喜公傳』 『中山忠能履歷資料』 『京都守護職始末』등을 중심으로 당시의 實情을 파악하고자 한다.|The political and economic foundation of the Bakuhan system began to show its limits in the late Tokugawa period. The weakened shogunate who had back up the seclusive policy helplessly should be kneeled to the foreign powers; Russia, France, United states and the United Kingdom kept the leadership with the Result of these foreign powers invading, new ideology and study was to be developed within the inner part of the Japan. The typical ideology would be the Reverence for the Emperor and expulsion of foreigners and the policy of the opening up of the country. It found its most forceful and powerful formulation in a blend of ethnic and Confucian teaching that associated loyalism with morality and justified. In the slogan "revere the emperor, drive out the barbarian!"(sonno-joi), loyalism wedded to antiforeignism became the most powerful emotion. Abe Masahiro, an able conciliator who had been roju since 1845, sent the Perry letter to the court for information and to the Tokugawa vassals with requests for advice. However, by signing the treaties without the emperor's approval, Ii Naosuke provoked an explosion of anger that spread political activity to the lower levels of the samurai class.(shishi) Large numbers of shishi resisted renewed subordination to their superiors through flight from the domain jurisdiction, seeking protection and employment under the aegis of a domain perceived as more committed to the imperial cause or entering the employment of court nobles in Kyoto who had need for bodyguards, agents, and messengers. The radical loyalists and shishi who made its street unsafe for suspected enemies. Several of the activists were killed in a hair-raising fracas in the dark. In the celebrate instance of symbolic rebellion, they lopped the heads off statues of the Ashikaga shoguns. Choshu stood as the principal protector and instigator of radical shishi and ronin activities at Kyoto. especially, loyalist nobles who adopted opinion of shishi and then realized in the political respect. The other side, The assassination of Ii Naoske was followed by a series of efforts to bring court and bakufu together in a new and more cooperative structure. It means "a bolstering of bakufu authority by the use of the imperial prestige." That proposals are usually grouped under slogan kobu-gattai, for reconciliation of court(ko) and camp(bu). There was antagonism between the loyalist and kobu-gattai during the 1862-4863. The 1862 reforms went on a series of steps that were cumulatively disastrous to bakufu primacy. A step that was the court nobles Sanjo Sanetomi and Anegakoji Kintomo proceed to Edo with orders from the court that the bakufu prepare to expel the foreiginers immediately. Another step that was undertaken to repair relations with Kyoto involved a visit to the imperial court by the young shogun Iemochi. Bakufu optimists hoped that his presence would serve to reestablish the awareness of bakufu primacy in Kyoto. But it worked out quite differently. He was obliged to show ritual humility in processions to imperial shrines, and his ceremonial deference to the emperor left little doubt of hid subordinate position. The shogun's visit was an important step in the growing transfer of political centrality to Kyoto. In 1863, however loyalists at Kyoto and in the domains overplayed their hand. Choshu insistence on implementing exclusion without waiting for bakufu instructions resulted in the four power naval demonstration at Shimonoseki. Moreover loyalist nobles were committed forgery of official papers. This miscalculations enabled the bakufu leaders in Kyoto to claim to be more effective implementers of the imperial orders for exclusion programs and to oust the loyalists from Kyoto.