수축주의 참 이론과 참의 규범성

Abstract

This paper aims at the critical examination of the deflationary theory of truth, especially asking how much deflation of the concept of truth we can afford. In spite of, or rather, because of its simpleness of the main thesis of the deflationary theory of truth, it is inclined to make us not to grasp what it is to bring to light about truth and what sort of changes in understanding truth it urges us to accept. So I will identify the functions and utilities of the deflationary concept of truth explicitly and show the change of view on the normativity of truth it brings about at the first place, and then examine critically the reasonableness of the change demanded by the deflationary theory of truth. Deflationary theory denies after all that truth is intrinsic norm of belief, which will turn out to be a mistake made by observing only one aspect of truth and ignoring the other, important one. Lastly it will be revealed that Horwich`s deflationism is not so deflationary as he himself think.